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Abstract
The set of fair (i.e. envy free and eﬃcient) allocation rules may be empty in well-
behaved pure exchange economies if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the
time of contracting. In addition, there may exist eﬃcient allocation rules such that
every agent envies another.
1 Introduction
The objective of the paper is to study to what extent some of the main results
of Varian (1974) may be generalized to exchange economies under asymmet-
ric information. Although the agents are asymmetrically informed about the
future state of the economy at the time of contracting, I assume for simplicity
that the state is veriﬁable when the contracts are implemented. Incentive and
measurability constraints are therefore irrelevant.
Agent i envies agent j if i prefers to be treated as j. Envy freeness, the ab-
sence of envy, is an appealing concept of equity in resource allocation problems.
Envy freeness combined with eﬃciency leads to a natural notion of fairness
(Foley, 1967; Varian, 1974). The set of fair allocations is non-empty for clas-
sical exchange economies (Varian, 1974). Indeed, any competitive equilibrium
allocation resulting from an equal sharing of the aggregate endowment is fair.
Eﬃciency under asymmetric information has been studied by Wilson (1978).
I apply his notion of interim eﬃciency, simply called eﬃciency in the present
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1paper. Further, I will say that an allocation rule is envy free if there is zero
probability of an agent envying another. I show in section 3 that these notions
of eﬃciency and of envy freeness may be incompatible in pure 2 exchange
economies if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting.
However, any constrained market equilibrium allocation rule (Wilson, 1978; de
Clippel, 2004) resulting from an equal sharing of the aggregate endowment in
each state of the economy is eﬃcient and satisﬁes a weak form of envy-freeness:
there does not exist two agents i and j such that it is common knowledge that
i envies j.
There is unanimous envy if every agent envies another. It is impossible to
have unanimous envy at an eﬃcient allocation in classical exchange economies
(Varian, 1974). Indeed, if there were unanimous envy, then one could achieve
a Pareto improvement by swapping the bundles of some agents. I show in
section 4 that there may be unanimous envy (even with probability one) at
some eﬃcient allocation rules when the agents are asymmetrically informed.
However, if an allocation rule is eﬃcient, then it is impossible to ﬁnd a subset
{i1,...,iK} of agents such that is common knowledge that ik envies i(k+1)modK
for each k ∈ {1,...,K}.
2 The Model
I start with some general deﬁnitions and notations. The ﬁnite set of agents
is denoted N. The ﬁnite set of goods is denoted L. The future state of the
economy is uncertain. Let Ω be the ﬁnite set of possible states. Let π be the
common prior that describes the relative probability of those states. I assume
without loss of generality that π(ω) > 0 for each ω ∈ Ω. The agents may
have some private information. The information of agent i is summarized by a
partition Pi of Ω. For each ω ∈ Ω, let Pi(ω) be the atom of the partition that
contains ω. The interpretation goes as follows. When the future state of the
economy is ω, i knows and only knows that it will be an element of Pi(ω). His
beliefs are derived from π by Bayesian updating. The true state of the economy
is common knowledge among the agents at some future date. It determines
their preferences and the aggregate endowment. Let e : Ω → RL
++ be the
function that speciﬁes the aggregate endowment of the economy. The agents
evaluate the lotteries according to the expected utility criterion, given the
concave, continuous and strongly increasing state-dependent utility functions
denoted ui : RL
+×Ω → R for each i ∈ N. Decisions are taken today about the
way to redistribute the endowments when the state will be common knowledge.
Hence the agents agree on allocation rules that specify a way to divide the
2 Pazner and Schmeidler (1974) show that envy freeness and eﬃciency may be
incompatible in economies with production, even under complete information.
2total endowment of the economy in each state: a : Ω → RL×N
+ such that
P
i∈N ai(ω) ≤ e(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω.
An allocation rule a0 Pareto dominates an allocation rule a if every agent
weakly prefers (given his private information) a0 over a in each state of the
















for each i ∈ N and each ω ∈ Ω, one of the inequalities being strict. An
allocation rule is eﬃcient (see the notion of interim eﬃciency in Wilson, 1978)
if it is not Pareto dominated by any other allocation rule.
Let a be an allocation rule and let ω be a state of the economy. Then, agent













The allocation rule a is envy free if there is zero probability of an agent envying
another, i.e. there does not exist a state ω at which some agent i envies some
agent j. An allocation rule is fair if it is both eﬃcient and envy free. Palfrey
and Srivastava (1987) suggest the same notion of fairness in a slightly diﬀerent
framework. There is unanimous envy at ω if every agent envies another at ω.
Subsets of Ω are called events. An event E is common knowledge if it can be
written as a union of elements of Pi for each i ∈ N.
3 On the Impossibility to Achieve Fairness
The allocation rule that equally splits the aggregate endowment in each state
of the economy is envy free and therefore the set of envy free allocation rules
is not empty. Obviously, the set of eﬃcient allocation rules is not empty as
well. The next two examples show that the set of fair allocation rules may be
empty though.
Example 1 Consider three agents and one good (money). There are four
equally likely states: Ω = {ω1,ω2,ω3,ω4} and π(ω) = 1/4 for each ω ∈ Ω. The
following table speciﬁes the aggregate endowment as well as the information
3and the utility function of the agents.
State e(.) P1(.) P2(.) P3(.) u1(x,.) u2(x,.) u3(x,.)
ω1 1800 {ω1,ω2} {ω1,ω3} {ω1} x
√
x x
ω2 1200 {ω1,ω2} {ω2,ω4} {ω2} x
√
x x
ω3 1200 {ω3,ω4} {ω1,ω3} {ω3} x
√
x x
ω4 1800 {ω3,ω4} {ω2,ω4} {ω4} x
√
x x
An allocation rule a is envy free if and only if it satisﬁes the following inequa-
tions:

         
         
a1(ω1) + a1(ω2) ≥ maxi∈{2,3}[ai(ω1) + ai(ω2)]

















(∀ω ∈ Ω) : a3(ω) ≥ maxi∈{1,2} ai(ω)
which amounts to a1(ω) = a2(ω) = a3(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. The best among
those allocation rules is a where a(ω1) = a(ω4) = (600,600,600) and a(ω2) =
a(ω3) = (400,400,400). It is Pareto dominated by the allocation rule a0 where
a0(ω1) = a0(ω4) = (701,498,601) and a0(ω2) = a0(ω3) = (301,498,401). The
no-envy property combining restrictions based on diﬀerent pieces of infor-
mation may lead to allocation rules that do not exploit the possibilities of
insurance.
I suggest a similar example where, contrarily to the previous example, the ag-
gregate endowment is constant while the utility functions are state dependent.
Example 2 Only the aggregate endowment and the utility functions of the
agents diﬀer from the previous example. They are speciﬁed as follows.
State e(.) u1(x,.) u2(x,.) u3(x,.)
ω1 1200 x 2x x
ω2 1200 x x x
ω3 1200 x x x
ω4 1200 x 2x x
As before, it is easy to check that an allocation rule a is envy free if and only
if a1(ω) = a2(ω) = a3(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω. The best among those allocation
4rules is a where a(ω) = (400,400,400) for each ω ∈ Ω. It is Pareto dominated
though by the allocation rule a0 where a0(ω1) = a0(ω4) = (3,796,401) and
a0(ω2) = a0(ω3) = (799,0,401).
I now discuss a related paper by Gajdos and Tallon (2002). The ex-ante stage
represents the situation that prevails before the agents learn their private
information. There is uncertainty but the information is symmetrically dis-
tributed: Pi = {Ω} for each i ∈ N. The ex-post stage represents the situation
that prevails once the state of the economy is common knowledge. I studied
the resource allocation problem at the interim stage: the agents know their
private information while the state of the economy is not yet common knowl-
edge. Gajdos and Tallon study allocation rules that are both ex-ante eﬃcient
and ex-post envy free. These are called intertemporally fair. Intertemporal fair-
ness is a strong requirement that is hard to satisfy. In particular, it is stronger
than my notion of fairness. Indeed, ex-post envy freeness implies envy freeness
and ex-ante eﬃciency implies eﬃciency. Results establishing the existence of
some intertemporally fair allocation rules are powerful. 3 On the contrary, ex-
amples showing the non-existence of such rules are weak. Indeed, it amounts
to state that strong ex-post criteria are incompatible with insurance. My two
examples are more interesting as they show the possible incompatibility of
eﬃciency with envy freeness at the interim stage. Observe ﬁnally that if the
third agent is dropped from the ﬁrst example then the allocation rule a where
a(ω1) = a(ω4) = (105,75) and a(ω2) = a(ω3) = (45,75) is fair but not in-
tertemporally fair.
I conclude the section by showing that eﬃciency may be compatible with a
weaker notion of envy freeness. A constrained market equilibrium is a notion
of price equilibrium introduced by Wilson (1978, footnote 6) as a technical
tool to prove the non-emptiness of the coarse core. It can be justiﬁed through
a convergence result, as the type-agent core shrinks towards the set of con-
strained market equilibria when the economy is replicated (see de Clippel,
2004). An allocation rule a is a constrained market equilibrium resulting from
an equal split of the aggregate endowment in each state of the economy if it
















3 There always exists some intertemporally fair allocation rule in any well-behaved
sunspot economy. Indeed, the allocation rule that speciﬁes in each state of the econ-
omy the same competitive equilibrium allocation resulting from an equal sharing
of the (state-independent) aggregate endowment is both ex-ante eﬃcient and ex-
post envy free. This is the only non-emptiness result that Gajdos and Tallon obtain












ω ∈ Ω and each i ∈ N.
Proposition 1 Let a be a constrained market equilibrium resulting from an
equal split of the aggregate endowment in each state of the economy. Then, it
is impossible to ﬁnd two agents (i,j) and a common knowledge event E such
that i envies j at each ω ∈ E.
Proof: Suppose on the contrary that there exists a common knowledge event
E such that i envies j at each ω ∈ E. Let p : Ω → RL
+ be the price vector


































This is absurd. The strict inequality follows from the fact that aj must be
out of the budget set of agent i for each ω ∈ E as he prefers aj over ai at those
states. The weak inequality follows from the fact that aj satisﬁes the budget
constraint of agent j for each ω ∈ E. 
Notice that the set of constrained market equilibrium resulting from an equal
split of the aggregate endowment in each state of the economy is non-empty
(de Clippel, 2004, theorem 4) and is included in the set of eﬃcient allocation
rules, as it is a subset of the coarse core.
4 Eﬃciency with Unanimous Envy
The following example shows that there may be unanimous envy at some
ω ∈ Ω even if the allocation rule is eﬃcient.
Example 3 Consider the following allocation rule in the economy described
in example 2: a(ω) = (0,700,500) if ω ∈ {ω1,ω4} and a(ω) = (700,0,500) if
ω ∈ {ω2,ω3}. It is easy to check that a is eﬃcient. On the other hand, every
agent envies another, whatever the future state of the economy: agents 1 and
2 both envy agent 3 whatever the future state, while agent 3 envies either
agent 1 or agent 2 as a function of the future state.
The previous example shows that it may even be common knowledge that
6there is unanimous envy at some eﬃcient allocation rule. A necessary condition
for this result is that the improving cycle varies with the future state of the
economy, as the following proposition highlights.
Proposition 2 Let a be an eﬃcient allocation rule. Then there do not exist
a subset {i1,...,iK} of agents and a common knowledge event E such that ik
envies i(k+1)modK for each k ∈ {1,...,K} and at each ω ∈ E.
Proof: Otherwise, the allocation rule a0 deﬁned as follows Pareto dominates
a: a0(ω) := a(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω \ E, a0
i(ω) := ai(ω) for each ω ∈ E and each
i ∈ N \ {i1,...,iK}, and a0
ik(ω) := ai(k+1)modK(ω) for each ω ∈ E and each
k ∈ {1,...,K}. 
5 Conclusion
There may exist a fundamental trade-oﬀ between the objectives of eﬃciency
and equity (envy freeness) when the agents are asymmetrically informed. As
a second best, one may search for the allocation rules that are eﬃcient within
the class of envy-free allocation rules. Another option is to develop a criterion
that allows to compare the equity properties of diﬀerent allocation rules. Let
for instance n(ω) ∈ {0,...,n} be the number of agents envying at least one
other agent at ω. Section 3 shows that it may be impossible to ﬁnd an eﬃcient
allocation rule with n(ω) = 0 for each ω ∈ Ω. Section 4 shows that there may
exist eﬃcient allocation rules with n(ω) = n for each ω ∈ Ω. One could
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